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Executive Summary 
The United Nations has been engaged in Afghanistan in various ca-
pacities ever since 1946. It has provided humanitarian and develop-
ment aid, as well as playing a specific political role during the many 
wars in the country. In the 1980s the UN led a multi-party mediation 
effort that concluded the Geneva Accords, and in the 1990s it oversaw 
a series of agreements between the Afghan government and Mujahe-
din leaders. After the events of ‘9/11’, the United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was mandated by the Security 
Council to take on a range of responsibilities – managing relief, re-
covery and reconstruction activities, holding elections, in addition to 
providing political and strategic advice for the peace process.  
 
At a time when policy and strategic reviews are being conducted in 
major Western capitals it is important to examine the role of UNAMA 
as well. This report focuses on its role in peacemaking, state-building 
and coordination. Some of the main findings are the following:  
 
 UNAMA played a critical role in facilitating the Bonn process 
that set the roadmap for re-establishing territorial sovereignty 
to Afghanistan in 2001. Although it has been hailed as a dip-
lomatic miracle, both the UN and the USA failed to include 
many Pashtun groups and the Taliban in the process. This ex-
clusion in 2001 and the continued unwillingness of the USA to 
engage these groups have resulted in many groups in the South 
opposing the Afghan government (among other things). The 
situation has also provided a challenging environment for the 
UN to facilitate a political process. This has shown that, for a 
peace deal to be sustainable, all conflicting parties need to be 
signatories to an agreement such as the one in Bonn. 
 
 The USA and the UN have on some occasions worked at 
cross-purposes. Activities undertaken in the name of the ‘war 
on terror’ and short-term successes have undermined the UN’s 
focus on peacemaking and peacebuilding. Backing and fund-
ing Mujahedin leaders and warlords as well as recruiting mili-
tiamen to fight against the Taliban have undermined the UN’s 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) pro-
gramme and its work on transitional justice. This is sympto-
matic of the lack of common purpose and strategy in Afghani-
stan. 
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 A major comparative advantage of UNAMA is its in-country 
expertise and institutional memory that builds on the UN fam-
ily’s decades-long engagement. UNAMA is the closest one 
gets to an impartial actor with no other interest but to serve the 
Afghan people. Nevertheless, its credibility has been put into 
question on occasion – particularly in 2002, when stability was 
chosen over justice. 
 
 UNAMA’s set-up has hampered its ability to be successful in 
many spheres. The ‘light footprint’ approach was understood 
by UN Headquarters to mean having a limited presence with a 
small group of professional staff. That has hindered UNAMA 
in being an effective coordinator of donor assistance and inter-
national political engagement.  
 
 In recent years when UNAMA has sought to expand, it has 
been severely limited by the bureaucratic recruitment proce-
dures at its headquarters in New York. Despite having the 
funds, the recruitment process takes about a year. This is not 
unique to the UN mission in Afghanistan: the need for reform 
in this area is critical for setting up quick and flexible UN mis-
sions in the future.  
 
 UNAMA’s ability to coordinate the international community1  
has also been limited by the general way in which the interna-
tional community has organized itself. There is no single chain 
of command, as the military forces are not peacekeepers under 
a UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG).  
Having two separate structures for the post-conflict operation 
is problematic, resulting in several plans for the same province 
or region. Moreover it is problematic that the military com-
mand is not subordinated to a civilian head given that the secu-
rity line of operation is only the supporting one, not the lead. 
The frequent rotations within the military mean a lack of the 
continuity that could have been expected if the UN had been 
the lead. 
 
 The organizational set-up is problematic also because there are 
three supranational structures seeking to coordinate civilian ef-
forts: UNAMA, the European Union and the NATO Senior 
Civilian Representative (SCR). Coordination of donor funds is 
difficult for any institution because power over the purse sits in 
the capitals and philosophies differ as to how aid should be 
                                                 
1  The term ‘international community’ will be used to refer to the (primarily Western) do-
nors and troop-contributing countries and major actors, like the World Bank and UN 
agencies, that are present in Afghanistan.  
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spent to be most effective. Today there are three such organi-
zations – surely a waste of resources and time.  
 
 With regard to the internal organization of UNAMA, the inte-
grated mission concept seems to have worked, to a consider-
able degree. It has provided broader awareness within the mis-
sion about the cross-cutting and overlapping challenges. How-
ever, the potential of such an organizational set-up seems un-
der-utilized. This may be because UNAMA lacks its own stra-
tegic plan for how it wants to implement the Security Council 
mandate.  

1. Introduction 
At a time when policy and strategic reviews are being conducted in 
major Western capitals, it is important to examine the role the UN has 
played in Afghanistan, particularly the United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). 2 The world organization has been 
engaged in Afghanistan in various capacities since 1946. It has pro-
vided humanitarian and development aid as well as being politically 
involved during the many wars that have wracked the country. In the 
1980s, the UN played a special role in leading a multi-party mediation 
effort involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA that 
concluded the Geneva Accords. In the 1990s, it oversaw a series of 
agreements between the Afghan government and Mujahedin leaders 
and engaged regional powers in the ‘Six plus Two’ group.3  
 
After the events of 9/11, UNAMA was mandated by the Security 
Council to take on a range of responsibilities, from managing relief, 
recovery and reconstruction activities, to holding elections as well as 
providing political and strategic advice for the peace process. Despite 
quite an extensive mandate, it was the explicit wish of the Special Re-
presentative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Lakhdar Brahimi that 
this UN operation should be small. The lessons that he, like many oth-
ers in the UN Secretariat and the Security Council,4 drew from the UN 
operation in Kosovo and East Timor was that the international foot-
print had been too big. The term ‘light footprint’ in Afghanistan was 
therefore used to describe one thing seen from a UN perspective: Af-
ghan sovereignty. It was a deliberate desire of the UN that Afghans – 
not international bureaucrats – would take charge of the destiny of the 
country.5 In practice, the UN translated this desire into having a small 
presence on the ground with few UN bureaucrats. A second associa-
tion with the term ‘light footprint’ has therefore been to a small-scale 
UN operation.  
 
Initially, this approach suited the USA and European states quite well, 
as their main objective was to go after al-Qaeda. While these states 
                                                 
Iselin Hebbert Larsen was a research consultant with the Norwegian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (NUPI), July to September 2009. She has worked with UNAMA and the 
OSCE in Afghanistan and holds a M.Sc. degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown 
University. Any views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author. 
 2  This paper is largely based on off-the-record interviews conducted in August/September 
2009 with current and former officials from UNAMA, UN agencies, ISAF and several 
key embassies in Kabul as well as the research community in Afghanistan.  
3  The 6+2 forum consisted of China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan plus the United States and Russia. 
4  It is the Security Council that ultimately decides on the mandate of UN peace operations; 
the 5th committee determines the resources provided to operations.  
5  Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and Security Council, A/56/875- 
S/2002/278. 
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were engaged in reconstruction activities, few resources were spent 
compared to other post-conflict operations.6 Some have therefore ter-
med this approach ‘nation-building light’ or ‘nation-building on the 
cheap’, and many today feel that its shortcomings sowed the seeds of 
the Taliban resurgence.7 ‘The international community had a golden 
opportunity to help Afghans build an effective government capable of 
providing its population with the most basic public services’.8 Some 
have therefore concluded that low input equals low output. With the 
current calls for a ‘political surge’, a ‘civilian surge’ and a ‘military 
surge’, it is timely to revisit the light vs. heavy footprint discussion.  
 
The conclusions drawn from Afghanistan will also form the basis for 
how future operations in ‘weak states’ are organized, which makes it 
important to get right the lessons to be learned. If the United Nations 
had taken a ‘heavy footprint’ approach, what would that have entailed 
in terms of resources and activities? Should the United Nations have 
served as a caretaker government for a certain period, for example? 
Should thousands of peacekeepers have been deployed? Should bil-
lions have been spent upfront on basic services? If that had been the 
case, would Afghanistan have been peaceful by now? And can we 
draw any generalizations from the Afghanistan experience to future 
endeavours? These are big questions, and this report will attempt to 
shed some light on them.  
 
The report examines the evolution of the role of UNAMA and its Se-
curity Council mandates in the post- 9/11era. 9 It begins by discussing 
UNAMA’s role in peacemaking, covering both the facilitation of the 
Bonn Agreement in 2001 and its current ‘good office’ support.10 We 
then turn to the ‘light footprint approach’ and examine UNAMA as a 
supporting agency in state-building as well as its role regarding the 
lead-construct and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) con-
struct. Thirdly, its coordination role in terms of internal coordination, 
coordination of the international community and coordination between 
the international community and the Afghan government, is analysed. 
Lastly, the organizational make-up of UNAMA as an integrated mis-
sion is evaluated. The report focuses primarily on UNAMA and does 
not discuss in depth the contributions of each UN agency.  
                                                 
6  Compared to the initial deployments of 60,000 in Bosnia in 1995 and 9,000 to East Timor 
(with a population less than 1 million) in 1999/2000, the 4500 soldiers deployed initially 
were very few (Dobbins 2005). 
7  Kilcullen 2009; Dobbins 2007a; Giustozzi 2008b. 
8  Dobbins 2007a. 
9  The mandate under scrutiny is United Nations Security Council Resolution 1806 (2008) 
and 1868 (2009), both with the same text.  
10  The term ‘good offices’ is used to explain the series of activities that the Secretary-
General himself or his envoys can undertake to mediate an end to a conflict or prevent 
conflict from erupting. It refers to the go-between function and transmitting messages and 
information between protagonists in a conflict. As the UN does not have any carrots or 
sticks, its role is confined to acting as an impartial facilitator, informal or formal, that en-
joys the prestige and backing of the world community.  
2. UNAMA and Peacemaking 
UNAMA’s overall goal is to promote peace and stability in Afghani-
stan and it is mandated by the Security Council to promote national 
reconciliation11. UNAMA have been involved in peacemaking in vari-
ous ways. It played a critical role in facilitating the Bonn process in 
2001which set out the roadmap for political transition and re-
establishing Afghan territorial integrity and sovereignty. Since then, 
the UN has been actively engaged in low-profile conflict resolution 
and outreach, and has cautiously pressed for a reconciliation process. 
However, there are many interpretations of ‘reconciliation’. To some, 
it means giving amnesty to militia leaders or warlords; others see it as 
an internal healing process between the victims and perpetrators of 
grave crimes. Others again see it as involving the regional and interna-
tional actors with the insurgent groups in a peace-process format. As 
yet, the Afghan government has not defined their understanding of the 
term, and the various international actors still have differing ideas 
about what it means. 
 
In outlining UNAMA’s role in peacemaking, various challenges, 
shortcomings and lessons learned will be discussed here. The main 
obstacle to peacemaking has been the Afghan government as well as 
resistance on the part of the USA and NATO to engage in a peace 
process. 
2.1 Facilitating the Bonn Process 
The UN was praised early on for the successful conclusion of the 10-
day negotiations that led to the Bonn Agreement in December 2001.12 
With only a few weeks to prepare, the UN brought together the North-
ern Alliance and three émigré groups to discuss how to re-establish 
permanent government institutions in Afghanistan.13 Also in atten-
dance were representatives of several members of the international 
community, including the USA. The participants agreed to set up an 
interim government to arrange an Emergency Loya Jirga (grand coun-
cil) that would indirectly elect a transitional administration and subse-
quently hold general elections, as well as undertake the process of 
drafting a new constitution by holding a constitutional Loya Jirga.  
                                                 
11  The Security Council mandate has nevertheless become narrower since UNAMA was first 
established in 2002.  
12  The Bonn Agreement is formally called Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Af-
ghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions.  
13  These émigré groups were the Cyprus Group of former Mujahedin, the Peshawar group 
and the Rome group composed of the royal family of Afghanistan.  
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Although the Bonn Agreement has been hailed as a ‘diplomatic mira-
cle’, it had several shortcomings. The main one was that major Pash-
tun tribes as well as key warring parties like the Taliban, Hezb-e-
Islami Gulbuddin and the Haqqani Network were not represented. As 
such, the Bonn Agreement cannot be referred to as a peace deal, since 
the major warring parties were not signatories. In fact, it was only 
SRSG Brahimi who signed the deal. The exclusion of these groups set 
the stage for many in the Pashtun South to oppose the government in 
Kabul, which, they say, is run by Northern leaders.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, it would have been unthinkable to 
include individuals or groups that Washington saw as ‘terrorists’. The 
UN did little to include them either. The reason seems to be partly a 
result of US pressure and partly based on the belief that the post-Bonn 
process would manage to reach out to those in the Taliban movement 
who might be willing to join the political process.14 However, the UN 
did not systematically try to include the excluded groups in the politi-
cal process or deal. Indeed, in July 2002, Lakhdar Brahimi maintained 
that the Taliban and al-Qaeda remained a threat to security in Af-
ghanistan – thereby taking the same line as the US administration.15  
 
The most important political process where the Taliban could legiti-
mize itself was the Loya Jirga and the elections to parliament and the 
provincial council. In the first half of 2002, Karzai also publicly left 
the door open to the possibility of the Taliban playing a role in gov-
ernment.16 A small number of prominent Taliban officials joined the 
new institutions as individuals, but the Taliban movement was not 
asked to take part in a deal. In some ways, this exclusion sowed the 
seeds of the subsequent insurgency. Alienation from the post-2001 
political process and exclusion from access to power and resources 
have been a key motivating factor for most insurgent foot soldiers.17  
 
A key explanatory factor in this inadequate process was the difference 
between UN and US objectives and the special environment after 
9/11. In many ways, the US objectives and modus operandi were at 
odds with UN objectives. Washington’s policy on Afghanistan was 
framed in terms of counterterrorism objectives: the ‘war on terror’. 
The objective was to destroy the safe haven from which al-Qaeda had 
planned and directed the 9/11 attacks. The Taliban movement was 
lumped into the same enemy-category. As a result, the US authorities 
chose to work with neighbouring governments and local Afghan war-
                                                 
14  Brahimi, Lakhdar, ‘A New Path for Afghanistan’, New York Times, 7 December 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/05/ AR2008120503191. 
html 
15  Semple 2009: 27. 
16  Semple 2009: 29. 
17  Rutting 2009: 2. 
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lords to oust the Taliban and chase down al-Qaeda.18 That made it un-
thinkable to include ‘terrorists’ in a peace process. 
 
The objectives of the UN were very different, in that they focused on 
peacemaking and peacebuilding, through sustainable processes and 
long-lasting development. More specifically, the overall objective in 
2002 was to support the implementation of the Bonn Agreement proc-
esses as well as to promote national reconciliation and rapprochement 
across the country.19 Without support from the USA to further the rec-
onciliation agenda, the UN faced major challenges, as it is difficult to 
have one group chasing the Taliban and another inviting them for 
talks.  
 
Furthermore, hoping that the operation in Afghanistan would be short-
lived, Washington was not focused on the sustainability of the politi-
cal process or the recurrence and exacerbation of underlying prob-
lems.20 This was particularly evident when the UN was trying to dis-
arm militiamen as part of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Rein-
tegration (DDR) programme established after the Bonn process. The 
USA counteracted the DDR programme by recruiting the militiamen 
as a way of establishing security without having to use its own US 
forces.21 This undermined a key role given to the UN in the war to 
peace transition, as well as efforts to establish a credible transitional 
justice mechanism. Only gradually did Washington become more en-
gaged in democracy-building initiatives and, to a limited degree, in 
dialogue. However, a key window of opportunity was missed in the 
early stages.  
 
One specific lesson for the UN is that sustainable peace cannot be 
achieved without a proper peace deal that heeds both the conflicting 
parties and the causes of war. In particular, serious efforts need to be 
made to include the warring parties. Further, in order to fulfil its man-
date, the UN depends on the support, in words and action, of other 
members of the international community – the USA not least.  
2.2 Conflict resolution, outreach and reconciliation 
UNAMA enjoyed high status among the Afghan people after the Bonn 
Agreement, and people were confident that the world organization 
would bring peace to their country. People were also willing to stop 
fighting, and many agreed to the UN serving as a third party in resolv-
ing their conflicts. UNAMA headquarters in Kabul and its field of-
                                                 
18  Dobbins 1999: 5. 
19  UNAMA’s original mandate was established in the Secretary-General’s Report A/56/875- 
S/2002/278. 
20  Asia Society 2009:11. 
21  Rashid 2008: 128. 
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fices came to play an active role in mediating communal disputes like 
control over resources, perceived injustices suffered by certain groups, 
and conflicts among political groups. In the north, queues were often 
observed outside UNAMA offices, with people bringing their com-
plaints and disputes to be resolved. 22 UNAMA shuttled between the 
factions to quell outbreaks of fighting in the centre and west as well. 
Nonetheless, without a peacekeeping force, the United Nations was 
left to play a minimally effective role in terms of its good offices.23 
 
As the insurgency and insecurity deepened, people came to UNAMA 
less frequently. Sometimes they would choose UNAMA as an inter-
mediary and sometimes other groups or bodies with authority. 
UNAMA’s direct role in low-key conflict resolution lessened with 
time, but its officials continued to reach out and engage in dialogue 
with all levels of society, including those indirectly associated with 
the insurgency. Such work was termed ‘political outreach’. The initial 
idea was that UNAMA would use its role as an impartial third party to 
engage with figures related to the insurgency as a first step, before 
linking them with the administration and official reconciliation appa-
ratus.24 However, UNAMA was hindered in doing this, for many rea-
sons. 
 
UNAMA’s limited role in both outreach and reconciliation has pri-
marily been a result of the indecisiveness and lack of will shown by 
the Afghan government, the USA and NATO to engage in a recon-
ciliation or peace process. This has meant lack of clarity on what role 
the international community wants UNAMA to play. This confusion is 
particularly evident in the mandates provided by the Security Council 
since 2008. On the one hand, UNAMA is mandated to strengthen its 
field presence and conduct political outreach, but it is restricted to en-
gaging in reconciliation issues on its own. In fact, UNAMA is to pro-
vide good offices only ‘if requested by the Afghan Government’ and 
to support ‘the implementation of an Afghan-led reconciliation pro-
gramme, within the framework of the Afghan constitution’.25 
 
The problem is that there is a fine line between ‘political outreach’ 
and reconciliation. Both entail reaching out to the insurgent groups. 
The scope of outreach ranges from talking to ordinary individuals and 
government officials, to elders, tribal and community leaders and oth-
ers who may or may not be in contact with insurgent groups. Some 
hold that talking to Taliban members is part of outreach, while others 
argue that it marks the first step in reconciliation. This lack of clarity 
was experienced when the Afghan government expelled a UNAMA 
                                                 
22  Interview with UNAMA officials. 
23  Thier 2006: 523. 
24  Semple 2009: 73. 
25  UN Security Council Resolution 1806/2008, article 4.d. 
UNAMA in Afghanistan 15 
and EU official in 2007 for having contact with Taliban members in 
Helmand.26 While few details are publicly available concerning this 
case, it shows that UNAMA is caught in a bind. On the one hand, the 
international community wants it to do more with regard to political 
outreach; but the Afghan government wants UNAMA to do less. As a 
result, UNAMA officials have exerted particular caution in doing out-
reach and taken on the role as the ‘local shrink’, but with limited suc-
cess in actual conflict resolution.  
 
All current local efforts at outreach are limited by the absence of a na-
tional reconciliation process. And as UNAMA is supposed to act only 
when requested by the Afghan government, its activities have been 
few, since the government has been indecisive with regard to recon-
ciliation. It fears ‘international meddling’, and such a process is not 
seen as being in the government’s interest. The government aban-
doned both the 2005 Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation and Jus-
tice27 and the 2008 Reconciliation Principles28 that had been devel-
oped in cooperation with UNAMA. While UNAMA is able to support 
the government, it has no leverage over it. Only the USA and NATO, 
and perhaps neighbouring countries,29 would be in a position to use 
carrots and sticks to get the Kabul government engaged in a process. 
While the USA and NATO have expressed the will to talk with the 
Taliban, they are concerned only with lower-ranking Taliban mem-
bers, in an Iraq-type ‘Awakening Council’ style – not the top leader-
ship.30 Both the USA and NATO are parties to a conflict where they 
are supporting one side in a civil war. When the warring parties have 
no interest in a process, the role of UNAMA becomes limited.  
 
Besides UNAMA, the UN Security Council itself is a player in the 
reconciliation process, having set up the 1267 sanctions list over the 
members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Considerable debate has taken 
place about whether this ‘blacklist’ serves to enable or limit the recon-
ciliation process.  Some within the Afghan government have argued 
that the near-impossible process of getting individuals removed from 
the list acts as a disincentive to Taliban commanders to join a recon-
ciliation process.31 Others argue that this is merely an excuse for the 
government to sit on the fence, since the fact that already 12 out of 
142 names have been taken off the list proves that it is not impossi-
                                                 
26 Arab News, ‘Kabul Orders UN, EU Officials Out’, 26 December 2007:  
http://www.arabnews.com/?page=4&section=0&article=104981&d=26&m=12&y=2007  
27  ‘Peace, Reconciliation and Justice in Afghanistan. Action Plan of the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’, 6-7 June 2005,  
http://www.aihrc.org.af/tj_actionplan_19_dec_05.htm  
28  Semple 2009: 64. 
29  Saudi Arabia was engaged by the Afghan National Security Council in 2008, but with 
limited success (Christia and Semple 2009). 
30  Al-Jazeera, ‘US open to Afghan Taliban Talks’, 8 March 2009,  
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/03/20093885411963197.html 
31  Interview, Kabul, September 2009.  
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ble.32 It seems that de-listing could be part of a wider reconciliation 
process as a bargaining tool. However, UNAMA has no authority over 
the Security Council, and it is they who ultimately decide who is to be 
de-listed. Such a process would have to be done in parallel with a rec-
onciliation process.  
2.3 UNAMA in a future peace/ political process  
When discussing what role UNAMA could play in a political process 
it is important to be clear as to what such a process would entail. As 
noted, any involvement in a national reconciliation process between 
the Afghan government and the insurgent groups is dependent on invi-
tation by the Afghan government. Without the will on the part of the 
warring parties and without a more flexible mandate from the Security 
Council, UNAMA can play only a minor role in this area. 
 
However, the conflict is not limited to the Afghan government and the 
insurgent groups: it includes the USA, NATO and the other countries 
of the region as well. Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar have 
reportedly announced that they would agree to talks only when the US 
troops leave Afghanistan.33 The USA, as a party to the conflict, needs 
to agree to talks. While Mullah Omar’s call for US withdrawal can be 
understood as a way of raising the stakes before a bargaining process 
begins,34 a timeline for troop withdrawal would need to be part of the 
process. Such was the case when the UN facilitated the Geneva nego-
tiations in the 1980s which led to the Soviet drawdown. The Obama 
administration has been preoccupied with whether to support a troop 
surge and is paying less attention to the underlying causes and drivers 
of the conflict, which in part is linked to international military pres-
ence in Afghanistan.  
 
As many have argued, peace in Afghanistan is dependent on support 
from the neighbouring countries.35 The UN might perhaps revive the 
‘Six plus Two’ group established in 1996 and used in 2001 in prepara-
tion for the Bonn process, to pursue a political process. In addition, 
given the UN’s history in engaging with the Taliban directly or indi-
rectly, it might play a role in facilitating multi-party talks through va-
rious channels, including Pakistan.  
 
                                                 
32  Semple 2009. 
33  Interview with former Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan, Rustam Shah Mohmand. S. 
Koster, ‘Talking to the Taliban is pointless’, Radio Nederland, 31 March 2009. 
http://static.rnw.nl/migratie/www.radionetherlands.nl/afghanistanconference/090331-
taiban-pakistan-redirected  
34  This has for example been the position of the former prime minister of Afghanistan, Ah-
med Shah Ahmedzai. See Al-Jazeera, ‘US Open to Afghan Taliban Talks’, 8 March 2009, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/03/20093885411963197.html 
35  The Obama administration has paid particular attention to the regional dimension (Rubin 
and Rashid 2008). 
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This complex conflict therefore needs a complex multi-party peace 
process. Whether such efforts can succeed depends largely on the will 
of the US administration and NATO. As long as the warring parties 
are unwilling to give up the fight, no process will be possible.  The 
time may not be ‘ripe’ for negotiations at the moment, as there is an 
unequal balance of power. Nevertheless, a case could be made for 
mandating the UN to act as a neutral arbiter to facilitate such a process 
once the parties are ready. Although some have argued that the UN no 
longer enjoys the status of being neutral and impartial because of its 
close relationship with the Afghan government and the USA, there are 
few others who could play such a role but the UN.  
 
The third possible role for UNAMA in the future would be to lead a 
Bonn-2 process. While the Kabul government may not be ready to un-
dertake major changes of the political system in a state of war, there is 
a need to revise the highly centralized system. The president has very 
extensive powers vis-à-vis the parliament and the sub-national level. 
A key issue of debate between the two leading presidential candidates 
was the current political system. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah proposed 
changing the system to a parliamentary system to enable better repre-
sentation of the various tribes and ethnic groups. Such a system would 
also encourage the formation of political parties which currently do 
not play a major role under the Single Non-Transferable Voting 
(SNTV) system. UNAMA, with its experience and lessons learned 
from the Bonn-1 process, would be a suitable organization for facili-
tating this effort.  
 

3. UNAMA and State-building? 
After the events of 9/11, the UN took the initiative to develop a highly 
ambitious state-building process36 in Afghanistan, aiming to reform 
and rebuild one of the world’s poorest and most conflict-ridden coun-
tries. The approach was different from previous peace operations. In-
stead of running a civilian transitional administration as in East Timor 
and Kosovo, the UN decided on a ‘light footprint’ approach. The idea 
was that Afghanistan should develop itself by taking charge from the 
beginning. That would ensure that a more sustainable and non-
international dependent governance structure would be established.37  
 
Some have argued that this light footprint approach was far from suf-
ficient to meet the ambitious state-building agenda set by the Bonn 
Agreement.38 This view holds that the lack of progress in developing a 
capable state and responding to social needs largely explains the resul-
tant political crisis, with a population disconnected and disillusioned 
by the corrupt government. It is even argued that the Taliban resur-
gence was due just as much to inadequate resourcing from the interna-
tional community as to the talents of the insurgents.39  
 
Others, however, have argued that a light footprint was indeed right 
and that the subsequent failures and insecurity stem from the interna-
tional actors being misled by their own ambitions.40 The latter view 
partly stems from a belief that it is impossible for the international 
community to build an Afghan state.41  One point that both sides seem 
to have ignored is how and by what means the light footprint was im-
plemented.   
3.1 Building central governing institutions from the sideline 
The focus for UNAMA from 2002 to 2005 was on overseeing the im-
plementation of the Bonn Agreement, and raising funds accordingly. 
It also sought to coordinate the humanitarian and reconstruction ef-
                                                 
36  State-building is defined as ‘the attempt to reform, build and support government institu-
tions, with the aim of making them more effective in generating public goods. State-
building also seeks to increase the strength and centrality of the state in the governance of 
development assistance’ (Nixon 2007).  
37  This view was partly founded on the anti-colonialist sentiments of SRSG Lakhdar Bra-
himi, who was born in Algeria, but also on the Report of the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations that he chaired in 2000.  
38  Nixon and Ponzio 2007. 
39  Kilcullen 2009; Giustozzio 2008b.  
40  See Stewart 2007. 
41  Stewart 2009b. 
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forts undertaken by the over 20 UN agencies in the country. For 
UNAMA this meant facilitating the establishment of the emergency 
Loya Jirga and the constitutional Loya Jirga, supporting the drafting 
of the new constitution, setting up government offices and key func-
tions, establishing various commissions (like the human rights and 
civil service commission) as well as holding the presidential elections 
(October 2004), the National Assembly elections and the Provincial 
Council elections (September and November 2005).  
 
UNAMA played a key role in implementing the Bonn Agreement, and 
used experienced political affairs officers with in-depth knowledge of 
the country and language to ensure that the process was done the Af-
ghan way. The overarching view of UNAMA was that Afghans would 
never enjoy enduring peace and public security without open and ac-
countable governing institutions. The main focus was therefore on the 
constitution, the presidency, a few select ministries and the parlia-
ment.  
 
While the UN has been hailed for the assistance it provided in the im-
plementation of the Bonn Agreement, there were some significant 
negative aspects. The first was that SRSG Brahimi and UNAMA 
largely equated the ‘light footprint’ approach with a ‘hands-off’ ap-
proach, fielding only a small number of UN staff to the mission. In 
2002, the UN as a whole only had 300 international staff in Afghani-
stan.42 The dismal state of affairs with regard to the Afghan govern-
ment institutions, its ruined buildings and lack of (capable) staff as a 
result of over 20 years of war called for significant assistance. ‘Many 
of those employed in the administration during 2002–2004, especially 
at the higher level, had no previous professional experience and often 
lacked basic educational skills.’43 It was not uncommon to find semi-
illiterate Afghans heading key departments. Considerable technical 
assistance was needed to these officials, but also to human resource 
management.  
 
While UN technical advisers were fielded to the ministries, most UN 
agencies poured in assistance the traditional non-consultative way, 
sidelining the government.44 Building the capacity of government in-
stitutions at the same time as delivering humanitarian and develop-
ment is time-consuming, so UN agencies and NGOs simply chose to 
deliver the assistance themselves.  
 
Thus, instead of limiting UNAMA’s professional capacity, it might 
have been more appropriate to have a big footprint, but subordinated 
                                                 
42  UN Secretary-General, Report to the Security Council (S/2002/278). 
43  Giustozzi 2004: 6. 
44  Ghani and Lockhart 2008. 
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to Afghan decision-makers.45 What ensued was a weak UN and a 
weak Afghan government – and that certainly did not do much for 
building strong and accountable governing institutions capable of re-
sponding effectively to the basic needs of the population. Neverthe-
less, even without significant resources, the UN was able, through its 
regional offices, to do fund-raising, help Kabul communicate with the 
provinces and establish provincial coordination bodies chaired by the 
provincial governors. 
 
The second drawback about the UN assistance to the new political 
project was the considerable influence that SRSG Lakhdar Brahimi 
had on the political architecture and his decisions concerning ‘peace 
before justice’. In 2001, Brahimi had aligned himself with the USA 
and brought several warlords – among them Mohammad Fahim, Is-
mail Khan and Rashid Dostum – to the front row of the Emergency 
Loya Jirga, as well as accepting their participation in the Transitional 
Government. The USA, which had relied on precisely these individu-
als to oust the Taliban regime, had little choice but to accept their 
claim to power. The UN, on the other hand, could have argued against 
– but SRSG Brahimi was afraid of upsetting the fragile peace process 
and argued that ‘security is more important than justice.’46  
 
Afghan civil society groups argued that human rights abuses were 
themselves a source of the conflict. They held that without justice the-
re could be no peace.47 Therefore, taking this line compromised the 
credibility of the UN in the eyes of the Afghan public, who – like 
Karzai – demanded that the warlords be removed. It also contributed 
significantly to the rampant corruption, the ineffectiveness of the min-
istries ‘awarded’ to the warlords, and the impunity that prevailed in 
the following years. In many ways, Brahimi compensated for the light 
footprint by playing a major political role. This meant a retreat from 
the original idea of UNAMA’s approach, which was to let the political 
process and decisions be driven by Afghans. Of course,  the consoli-
dation of warlord power in the regions was due to other security deci-
sions as well. Still, the question for future operations remains whether 
to include potential ‘spoilers’ in the political process despite their 
dismal human rights record. 
3.2 Security and working at cross-purposes 
One of the most serious consequences of the ‘light (security) foot-
print’, as adopted by the USA, was the resultant security vacuum and 
the subsequent revival of warlord militias in the first years. The UN 
                                                 
45  Thier 2006: 528. 
46  Interviews, Kabul, September 2009. 
47  Thier 2006: 524. 
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and the USA were working at cross-purposes. The US-led military 
coalition focused on ‘rooting out the terrorist networks’ of al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban. Instead of deploying ground troops, Washington fun-
ded Northern Alliance groups and recruited local militias to fight. 
While this made sense militarily, it meant significant political obsta-
cles for the UN in carrying out the Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) programme, as well as in doing conflict resolu-
tion, since factional infighting was being fuelled. Little attention was 
paid to securing the country as a whole through a broader peacekeep-
ing operation, as the UN had called for.48 While the UN had mandated 
the establishment of a peacekeeping force – the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) – the USA actively opposed its existence and 
particularly its expansion beyond Kabul. 
 
While the light footprint approach had early on been hailed in Wash-
ington as a quick fix to Afghanistan, the unintended consequences 
were many and devastating. As Alexander Thier explains: ‘the return 
of warlord militias brought internecine fighting, ethnic tensions, cli-
ents for outside interference, and a booming narcotics trade. These 
regional power brokers were able to consolidate their power faster 
than the internationally supported Bonn process could consolidate the 
state.’49 The financial resources these warlord commanders received 
from the USA were spent on investing in drug production and engag-
ing in land grabs, predation, political intimidation, and ethnic clean-
sing  –  a major source of insecurity for Afghans.50  
 
A UN role in peacekeeping became sidelined in favour of the initially 
UK-commanded multinational International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) approved by the Security Council in 2001. In view of the slow 
bureaucratic processes at the UN, this was the quickest way to get 
adequately equipped troops on the ground. Nevertheless, the force 
amounted to only 4,500 soldiers in 2002 and remained in Kabul. In-
stead of being handed over to the UN, the command was given to 
NATO, as it was believed that NATO would be able to mobilize more 
forces. Regardless, the force was not able to carry out its peacekeep-
ing functions outside Kabul until October 2003 because of US resis-
tance. This might not have been the case if the force had been under 
UN command. A UN force might, as it often does in these operations, 
also have focused on sending police, since much of the instability in-
volves criminality.  
 
The meagre results of the light security footprint can be understood as 
a contributing factor to the insurgency resurgence. As James Dobbins 
                                                 
48  Vaishnav 2004: 249. 
49  Thier 2006: 552. 
50  Rubin 2006: 5. 
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has concluded, ‘The insurgency came after we got there. It came as a 
result of U.S policy decisions, largely negative ones, such as the fail-
ure to establish peacekeeping forces. The U.S. left a huge security 
vacuum. It did this as a matter of policy because it was against nation 
building. But that allowed spoiler elements to employ violent resis-
tance.’51 
 
The set-up of ISAF with a separate chain of command to the UN de-
fied the recommendations of the 2000 Brahimi Report to have inte-
grated missions and unity of effort.52 The evolution of ISAF into Pro-
vincial Reconstruction Teams with lead-countries deploying civilians 
to do reconstruction further sidelined the role of the UN in relief and 
reconstruction. However, the most critical aspect of the growing in-
stability was the autonomous US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, 
with ‘kill and capture’ tactics, insensitive and culturally inappropriate 
‘raid strategies’ and use of air power (causing significant civilian 
casualties) that gradually turned Afghans against the international 
military, making them hostile toward the international community.  
 
The UN was left to monitor the security situation and to push forward 
the state-building agenda of the Afghan security forces, but without 
any contributions of its own. Due to the limited deployment of UN 
civilian police there was little technical advice that could be provided 
to Kabul’s largely dysfunctional Ministry of the Interior. Again, with 
the interpretation of ‘light footprint’ as meaning a light and limited 
capacity, UNAMA had difficulties in promoting various agendas and 
acting as the coordinator, because of lack of knowledge and capacity.  
 
It is becoming increasingly clear that never again should an interna-
tional intervention be organized in such a way. For one thing, as was 
underlined in the Brahimi Report of 2002, ‘the key conditions for the 
success of complex operations are political support, rapid deployment 
with a robust force posture and a sound peace-building strategy.’ A 
strong peacekeeping mission is of crucial importance, particularly 
when there has been no peace deal between the warring factions. Sec-
ondly, having separate chains of command undermines the develop-
ment of a common strategy and effort; and third, working at cross-
purposes, with one partner focusing on short-term gains and another 
on long-term development, severely hampers any progress. Serious 
efforts need to be made to develop a coherent post-conflict reconstruc-
tion strategy before intervening in any country.  
 
 
 
                                                 
51  James Dobbins in Scoblete interview 2009. 
52  United Nations (2000) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. 
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3.3 Reconstruction and Development53 
State-building is largely about building stable and legitimate institu-
tions that can respond effectively to citizen needs. The Bonn Agree-
ment was the framework for establishing central governing institu-
tions, but considerable work was needed in assisting the institutions to 
function. The international community chose to organize itself with 
regard to financial assistance by having UNAMA as the body that 
would assist the Afghan government in defining humanitarian and re-
construction priorities as well as mobilizing funds for these priorities. 
Individual states took on considerable responsibility in terms of the 
‘lead-nation’ concept and by managing specific Provincial Recon-
struction Teams (PRTs). However, because of the lack of state capac-
ity, most of the aid was – and still is – delivered through NGOs, con-
tractors and UN agencies. 
 
Instead of a strong role for UNAMA, ‘lead nations’ were made re-
sponsible for building specific sectors of the state.54 Germany was gi-
ven responsibility for police reform, Italy for justice reform, the UK 
for counter-narcotics, Japan for disarmament and the USA for secu-
rity.   
 
The advantage of organizing the reconstruction effort in this way was 
to make a particular country have ownership of one sector and feel 
publicly accountable for doing its part. However, the major drawback 
was that differences in commitment resulted in unbalanced progress. 
For example the USA first spent $155 million on training the army, 
then spent $797 million in 2004 and $788 million in 2005, whereas 
Germany spent a total of only $89 million between 2002 and 2006 on 
police reform.55 The dismal progress in police and justice reform were 
the two weakest links in the state-building exercise, according to 
Rashid.56 
 
A second disadvantage of having sector-leads, as opposed to one 
overall lead, lay in overseeing the areas where the sectors overlap, for 
example to ensure the proper distinction of roles and responsibilities 
between the police and army. Had UNAMA been more heavily re-
sourced with significant professional capacity in all sectors, it would 
have been able to ‘connect the dots’ and coordinate efforts better. 
While that is what the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board 
(JCMB) forum could address in practice, it never materialized. 
 
                                                 
53  The term is here used to cover technical assistance provided to government institutions as 
well as assistance in terms of social and economic development.  
54  Ayub and Kouvo 2008: 652. 
55  Rashid 2008: 204–205. 
56  Rashid 2008: 204. 
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In addition to the sector-leads, lead-nations were also established for 
setting up PRTs. This was the way ISAF was able to persuade Wash-
ington to deploy more troops outside Kabul. PRTs are meant to ‘assist 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, to facili-
tate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identi-
fied area of operation, and enable Security Sector Reform and recon-
struction efforts’.57 The question today remains how to fulfil this man-
date. Many PRTs have taken it to mean providing transport for pro-
vincial governors, provincial council members and district commis-
sioners to peripheral places. In the long run, this is largely unhelpful. 
Many problems arise when outside actors disturb the traditional power 
structures by assisting one group and not others. Internationals are 
fooled every day. 
 
For the most part, each PRT-nation has drawn up its own plans for 
how to develop ‘its province’ – and the result has been a highly con-
flicting policy process. For example, it took the international commu-
nity and the government several years to agree on a vision for the po-
lice, because of deep-rooted conflicts between the Americans and Eu-
ropeans on the type of police force appropriate for Afghanistan.58 
 
As the PRTs expanded, the UN as a whole always lagged behind, be-
coming a minor player towards the development and military footprint 
of the PRT. In some cases, UNAMA’s in-country expertise has been 
utilized, particularly its institutional memory, since PRTs have rota-
tions every 4 to18 months. On the other hand, because all PRTs want 
to stabilize their province within their rotation periods, they end up not 
having time to wait for Afghans to acquire additional capacity, and 
instead decide on projects or for them to draw up plans. Thus, PRT 
personnel have found themselves doing much of the reconstruction 
work themselves, or have sub-contracted it to other organizations, si-
delining the government.  Moreover, the main focus has been on 
quick-impact projects that would ‘win hearts and minds’59 – an ap-
proach that has very much defeated the light footprint spirit of having 
the Afghans at the helm. A particular problem in this regard is that 
‘local ownership’ has come to mean ‘their’ ownership of ‘our’ ideas, 
exemplified by cutting ribbons at openings of schools and health clin-
ics.  
 
A central question is whether the UN should have taken on the lead-
nation and PRT role in a UN provincial team set-up. That would have 
meant a clearer unity of purpose and command, ensuring that particu-
lar sectors would be implemented the same way and with equal distri-
                                                 
57  Islamic Government of Afghanistan, ‘Terms of Reference for the Combined Force Com-
mand and ISAF PRTs in Afghanistan,’ 27 January 2005.   
58  International Crisis Group 2008. 
59  See Waldman 2009 for insights on the ‘hearts and minds’ projects.  
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bution across the country. However, the UN is not automatically better 
equipped to undertake large nation-building projects. Issues of policy 
disputes, local ownership, aid-dependency and ‘how’ to stabilize a 
province would also have faced the UN. While the UN system as a 
whole has considerable experience with this type of work, the ‘how’ 
question is still fundamental, and the risk of building parallel struc-
tures would not necessarily have disappeared.60  
 
An approach employed in many countries is to use the national budget 
as a coordinating mechanism in funding national programmes, rather 
than earmarking particular programmes within a particular province. 
While international actors have been reluctant to provide budget sup-
port, mechanisms should have been sought in the form of international 
watchdogs over the money flow, which would have helped in promot-
ing financial transparency.  
 
It is often forgotten that all earlier modernizing regimes in Afghani-
stan were violently deposed, and their leaders killed or forced into ex-
ile.61 Slow change is therefore essential, but that does not fit well with 
the civilian or military sense of urgency. By pursuing a modernization 
process like state-building, the international community is rocking the 
boat of many established norms and practices. The process is essen-
tially one of social engineering. The Western-backed modernization 
project have encountered two types of resistance. One is tactical, re-
flecting the fear of being excluded from the benefits of change. The 
other is a more principled opposition related to an understanding of 
what constitutes a just and good society. 62 These are realities that of-
ten get ignored, but may return to haunt the international community 
unless they are taken seriously. The increasing outcries of ‘foreign in-
tervention’ in Afghan processes are evidence of this.  
 
A last point related to reconstruction is reform of the justice sector. In 
2001 the people welcomed the new order. They wanted the govern-
ment to save them from the abuse of local warlords, to secure the pea-
ce and provide prosperity.63 Thus far, however, the UN, the interna-
tional community and, not surprisingly, the Afghan government have 
only tiptoed around the issue of setting up a credible justice mecha-
nism for dealing coherently with the atrocities committed by the Wes-
tern-empowered warlords. Nothing has been done to ensure that these 
individuals would not be able to hold public office again and be in a 
position to commit the same crimes – as the 2009 elections have 
shown. It is becoming increasingly more difficult to deal with these 
individuals, now that they are in government and have become en-
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trenched in the formal and informal economy. Most interviewees held 
that these warlords would have to be neutralized in one way or an-
other, whether by putting them on trial in Afghanistan or The Hague 
or by the international community threatening to use force. The call 
for justice continues. This is one area where the UN could build up a 
considerable role for itself, since its rule of law unit has been strength-
ened.  
 
The idea that the international actors should take a backseat to an Af-
ghan-led political and development process is still a principle that 
should be adhered to. UNAMA nevertheless understood its ‘light 
footprint’ to mean almost no footprint, or a very thin one in terms of 
professional capacity. Given the weakness of institutional capacity in 
the government, UNAMA should have been supplied with more assis-
tance in the form of expatriate Afghan professionals and others to as-
sist the government, but also to provide strategic advice and to have 
the systems to coordinate international assistance. The most sustain-
able way of coordinating efforts and building up state capacity is to 
channel assistance through the Afghan government. That would have 
made the government more sovereign than it is today.  
 
 

4. UNAMA and Coordination 
UNAMA has been mandated to coordinate the international commu-
nity (including the assistance provided by them) in order to bring 
more coherent support to the Afghan government.64 As with any UN 
mission, a coordination mandate involves a triple challenge: (i) facili-
tating its own internal coherence, (ii) supporting and encouraging co-
herence among all the international or external actors, and (iii) facili-
tating and supporting coherence between the external and internal ac-
tors.65  
 
Coordination means different things to different actors. It can mean 
sharing of information, ensuring that programmes and activities do not 
overlap, having a joint strategy or framework to ensure complemen-
tary activities. The UN has understood coordination in all these 
senses, and has tried to influence and mobilize donors around under-
funded and under-prioritized issues. Complete coordination can never 
be achieved without a single chain of command, so the most useful 
discussion pertains to how to optimize coordination and coherence, 
while minimizing overlap and resources being wasted. How has 
UNAMA sought to meet the challenges in these three areas?  
4.1 Internal coherence 
As to internal coherence, this is discussed in greater detail in section 5, 
on integrated missions. ‘Internal’ has a dual meaning to the UN: inter-
nal within UNAMA, and the internal UN system. Concerning the for-
mer, a Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) was initially established 
to facilitate a common understanding on which to base decision-
making. This Centre was subsequently replaced with the Analysis and 
Planning Unit (APU), and planning was added. So far most planning 
has focused on facilitating coherence between the international actors 
and the government, and less on UNAMA coherence. Views differ 
widely as to what UNAMA is and should be doing. As we shall see, 
internal coherence has been limited by the lack of a strategy or vision 
post-Bonn. 
 
For the internal UN system, coherence has been challenging because 
the UN agencies are autonomous actors. Although the agencies have 
pledged to work as ‘One UN’, each agency has a separate board of 
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directors with its own mandates and visions. With a current total of 23 
UN agencies in country, ensuring coherence is difficult. Nevertheless, 
by employing a common planning platform and the increasing use of 
joint programmes and funds, coherence is better today than even be-
fore. The tool for driving this coherence has been the United Nations 
Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).  
4.2 External coherence: civilian side 
As per UNAMA’s mandate, the mission is expected to coordinate and 
ensure coherence among the international community, civilian and 
military. Such a mandate is to a large degree ‘mission impossible’. 
First of all, everyone wants to coordinate, and no one wants to be co-
ordinated: few states are willing to accept being told what to do by 
other actors. The willingness to be coordinated also seems to run par-
allel with the stakes involved. When troops and significant resources 
are involved, countries are even less willing to be told what to do.66 It 
is fine to be coordinated if one can continue with one’s activities, but 
not when behaviour or policy must be changed. 
 
With regard to coordination of civilian activities, some countries have 
stated that they are willing to be coordinated while others, among 
them the USA, do not accept taking orders from the UN in most cases. 
For one thing, US government spending is enormous and there are 
challenges related to delivering coherently among its own government 
agencies. But Washington also has its own national strategy for Af-
ghanistan, a strategy defined according to the US national interest – 
and the UN does not have the power to challenge that. Nevertheless, 
from certain embassies have come complaints that UNAMA does not 
have the systems to do coordination. As noted earlier, as a result of the 
light footprint approach, UNAMA has lacked capacity and profes-
sional expertise in all areas needed for coordination.  For example, 
there is no ‘who does what where’ spreadsheet or database from 
which to make specific recommendations. Nor is there clearly stipu-
lated what works and what does not. 
 
Nevertheless, UNAMA has used its agenda-setting power and position 
as coordinator to mobilize support for certain programmes and policy 
areas, among them agriculture, private-sector development and capac-
ity building.67 By organizing coordination fora in Kabul and abroad it 
has been able to draw attention to these policy areas. In addition it has 
used its position to mobilize resources to under-funded regions like 
the north and the central highlands of Afghanistan. This process has 
                                                 
66  Interview, Kabul, September 2009. 
67  These were priority areas decided in June 2008 at the Paris Conference by the Govern-
ment and the International Community, with UNAMA assisting in putting them on the 
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been very time-consuming, since decisions related to priority-setting 
and funding are often taken in capitals and not at the embassy or PRT 
level.68 As UNAMA does not have extensive capacity to determine 
across the board where the gaps are, it can play only a modest role, 
focusing on the big-picture policy areas. Given the many constraints, 
it is not realistic to expect coordination in every area. Moreover, 
UNAMA has no sanctioning power, so states can choose whether or 
not to be coordinated. 
 
Coordination is also challenging when there are multiple coordinating 
bodies. In addition to UNAMA, there is the EU Special Representa-
tive, charged with coordinating the EU members in Afghanistan. 
Every six months there is a new EU presidency, whose embassy takes 
the initiative to coordinate various sectors. The NATO Senior Civilian 
Representative was recently set up with the aim of coordinating the 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, even though the mandate is clearly 
to support the UN SRSG. There is also the ‘SRAP’ group (Special 
Representatives for Afghanistan-Pakistan group) chaired by Richard 
Holbrooke. While these fora and bodies are not necessarily in compe-
tition with each other, they waste time and resources. As one inter-
viewee noted, ‘there is an abundance of coordination on useless issues 
and too little on things that actually matter.’ 
 
Given UNAMA’s limited capacity, and in the interest of long-term 
institution-building, coordination is best done through channelling 
funds through the national budget. That would put the Kabul govern-
ment in a position to decide what to prioritize and where. In parallel 
there needs to be a capacity building element in the handling of funds 
to avoid corruption. There is certainly only so much money the gov-
ernment can absorb, but presently most of international assistance 
sidelines the government. Second comes the funding of national pro-
grammes. This way of coordination can help to ensure that there is no 
overlap and waste. Although donors have tried to align their funding 
according to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 
(ANDS), considerable earmarking and funding take place outside the 
government realm.  
4.3 External coherence: civilian--military 
With regard to civilian–military coordination, UNAMA’s mandate is 
to coordinate its activities with ISAF. Coordination in this sphere has 
been particularly challenging, due to the different understandings of 
the purpose of coordination, and to disagreements concerning the in-
gredients of a successful stabilization strategy.  
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ISAF has argued for a closer relationship with UNAMA, since coun-
terinsurgency work depends on both military and civilian effects. 
However, UNAMA has hesitated to be too close to the military and 
has kept its distance, which makes it difficult to be coordinating ac-
tivities. The main reason is that UNAMA is reluctant to be too closely 
associated with a body that inflicts casualties on the Afghan civilian 
population.69 In addition to being mandated to work with ISAF, 
UNAMA is also mandated to speak out and be independent when ci-
vilian casualties occur. It is important to maintain some distance to the 
military, as close cooperation risks compromising the security of staff 
as well as bringing into question UNAMA as impartial and independ-
ent of the military.  
 
UNAMA staff have held that it is impossible to change or influence 
the mindset of the military. Not only has ISAF been reluctant to take 
UN advice, they argue, but because of the high turnover it is difficult 
to establish a longer-term relationship based on mutual trust and un-
derstanding. One example is the continuous push from the military to 
‘build stuff’ so as to win the hearts and minds of Afghans. Some 
UNAMA staff would argue that the focus should be on outreach, gov-
ernance and the rule of law, as there has been no clear evidence that 
spending more money on development produces more stability.70 On 
the ground, the conflicting aims of counterterrorism and counterinsur-
gency between Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF have taken a 
particular toll on ISAF’s relationship with UNAMA, as there has been 
no single military voice.71 
 
While a formal relationship exists and input from UNAMA on mili-
tary planning has increased, ISAF has complained that UNAMA is too 
weak to deliver on the civilian side of counterinsurgency. UNAMA 
has pushed back and argued that the military is misunderstanding the 
role of UNAMA, as well as ignoring mandate and resource con-
straints, particularly at the sub-national level. First, it is not an imple-
menting body; second, it has limited experience in working in insur-
gency-type situations like Afghanistan.   
 
And third, UNAMA’s ability to reach out to Afghans and coordinate 
in the volatile areas, particularly the South and East, has become lim-
ited due to the deteriorating security situation. Also UN agencies have 
                                                 
69  Furthermore, the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF have had separate agen-
das, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency/ peacekeeping respectively, without a single 
chain of command. 
70  The billions of dollars spent in the South in recent years indicate that there is not a posi-
tive correlation between development money spent and stability given the deterioration in 
the security situation. 
71  For a discussion on counterterrorism vs. counterinsurgency, see Kilcullen 2009. 
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become increasingly unable to have a substantial presence in the 
South and East. This has led to a minimal presence of UNAMA in 
precisely those areas where, it is held, the military need UNAMA the 
most. The UN has thus become caught up in the military blame-game, 
where civilian weakness in implementation is seen as the reason why 
the military strategy is failing. In very few wars have civilian organi-
zations been able to carry out large scale development projects. 
 
Development practitioners, including UN implementing agencies, 
have a different outlook as to what aid should and can be used for. 
Traditionally they have channelled their assistance to needs-based and 
poverty-reducing projects, rather than programmes aimed at stabiliza-
tion.72 Development planning has operated with long-term horizons 
rather than the short-term ones preferred by the military. Coordina-
tion, or rather creating synergies, has therefore been difficult. Never-
theless, the UN agencies have made ‘governance, peace and stability’ 
their principal priority for the next four years, with specific pro-
grammes that aim to assist in stabilization. While perhaps not closer to 
the military, there is now an acknowledgement that a minimum level 
of stability is needed before one can engage in traditional development 
activities. 
 
Also on the humanitarian side there has been almost complete reluc-
tance to engage with the military. The military, on the other hand, 
have wanted to engage with the NGOs and have also themselves clai-
med to be providing ‘humanitarian relief’ to communities. This has 
proven particularly contentious, as the NGOs argue that, by definition, 
anything called ‘humanitarian’ must be based on the principles of hu-
manity, neutrality and impartiality – and that the military’s intentions 
do not fulfil those standards. Civilian–military guidelines have there-
fore been adopted to set out in explicit terms what is expected of each 
side.  
 
The more fundamental challenge to UNAMA-ISAF coordination is 
that the set-up and early prioritizations have resulted in ISAF becom-
ing the dominant force, with a heavy military footprint. Even though 
both the UN SRSG and the ISAF Commander have argued that the 
solution to Afghanistan must be political rather than military, the ac-
tual strategy and planning has been military-led, with minimal input 
and lead from UNAMA. In 2008 there was an exchange of letters be-
tween the NATO Secretary-General and the UN Secretary-General to 
formally establish a closer relationship. Many had hoped that the 
agreement would involve having the Commander of ISAF consult the 
                                                 
72  While needs-based development activities may have a stabilizing effect, UN agencies do 
not aim for their activities to be stabilizing as such. The military, however, would often 
like civilian bodies, like the UN agencies, to do more quick-impact projects – or ‘CIMIC’ 
in military-speak.  
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SRSG on a weekly basis and using the UN for its political insight and 
advice, rather than the political advisors and the NATO Senior Civil-
ian Representative who currently perform this job for ISAF. That 
would have been the closest one could get to better coordination be-
tween the two organizations. However, both UN HQ in New York and 
the incoming SRSG were reluctant to set up such a mechanism, for 
many of the reasons outlined above. Significant coordination between 
ISAF and UNAMA has thus been highly limited; and, given the in-
creased influence of Washington, the role of UNAMA vis-à-vis ISAF 
will only become weaker. 
4.4 Coherence between external and internal actors 
Facilitating and supporting coherence between the external and inter-
nal actors is the most challenging coordination task because of the 
sheer number of actors to be coordinated.  
 
Two complementing mechanisms have been sought to deal with this 
challenge. The first is the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 
(ANDS). UNAMA and the government have urged the international 
community to align their programmes and funds according to the Af-
ghan government’s strategy. The underlying reasoning is that such 
coordination is done most practically when actors use a joint overarch-
ing plan, as no individual actor has the capacity to coordinate at the 
activity level.  
 
This is a type of invisible, self-coordinating mechanism that ensures 
minimum coherence. While some have argued that it is a good coordi-
nating mechanism, it also has its limitations. The first is that most 
programmes and activities can be justified as being aligned to ANDS, 
as the strategy covers a vast list of diverse aims and objectives. Sec-
ondly, self-coordination is no guarantee for equal funding for each 
sector of a strategy, or for the even distribution of funds across the 
country.73  
 
Another limitation to using ANDS as a coordinating tool is that it is 
not viewed as a common strategy. Whilst some programmes and funds 
may be aligned to ANDS, there are competing strategies that take pre-
cedence. For example, there is the five-year ISAF Campaign Plan, as 
well as individual country strategies such as the new US strategy, the 
UK’s Helmand Roadmap and Norway’s Faryab strategy. In addition, 
                                                 
73  A significant challenge involved in having Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) is 
that countries earmark funding for ‘their’ province rather than for national programmes. 
For example, the UK sees Helmand province as being ‘Afghanistan’ and the USA have 
long seen Regional Command East as being ‘Afghanistan’. This has meant considerable 
differences in funding for the various provinces. As Afghans in the North often have 
questioned ‘do we need to start an insurgency in the North to receive development assis-
tance?’ 
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these strategies keep on changing and undergoing independent review. 
There is the general attitude that nothing in the past has worked and 
that one needs to start afresh every year, or every time a new military 
commander or new ambassador arrives in country. This high turnover 
of individuals and strategies presents a significant challenge to coor-
dination.  
 
The second coordination mechanism that seeks to bring coherence be-
tween the government and the international community is the Joint 
Coordination and Monitoring Body (JCMB). Originally set up to mo-
nitor implementation of the London Compact, it used to meet quar-
terly in various world capitals. As of 2008, the body has become a 
Kabul-based, high-level forum co-chaired by the Afghan government 
and UNAMA. While having ANDS as its principle document, the 
JCMB forum seeks to discuss and agree on priority areas for funding 
and raise certain policy areas to the attention of the principals.  
 
Many international actors see it as a useful forum for formally adopt-
ing agreed policy decisions, such as raising the ceiling on the number 
of troops in the Afghan National Army or agreeing to a plan for ca-
pacity building. It is also known as a forum where principals can be 
updated and discuss progress in certain areas, such as police reform. 
The chief limitation to this coordination mechanism is that it depends 
on unanimous vote, which in turn limits agenda items to the ‘lowest 
common denominator’ – those areas on which all agree. The main cri-
ticism of such coordination fora is therefore that there is too much co-
ordination of things that do not matter and too little focus on difficult 
questions like reconciliation and justice. However, given the auton-
omy and differing interests of the various representatives around the 
table, this mechanism seems the most realistic way to ensure some 
degree of internal/ external coherence. 
 
The mandate of coordination is a thankless task and close to ‘mission 
impossible’. Nevertheless, in several areas UNAMA has set up me-
chanisms for coordination that have made some progress in ensuring 
coherence – internal to the UN, within the international community, 
and between the international community and the government. Focus-
ing on coordination at the policy level, UNAMA has primarily under-
taken its role by mobilizing support and funds for certain policy areas 
and programmes.  
 
There are numerous challenges to coordination, including individual 
agendas and interests as well as the internal capacity and systems of 
UNAMA to act as lead coordinator. Expectations should be realistic 
as to what coordination can achieve, and one should not undertake co-
ordination simply for the sake of coordination. In order for UNAMA 
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to undertake effective coordination, despite the limitations, better ca-
pacity and systems are needed. That, however, brings us back to the 
UN’s inadequate bureaucratic procedures in New York, whereby mis-
sions do not receive the resources for implementing their mandates 
until one year after the Security Council resolution has been passed.  
5. UNAMA Organization: An Integrated 
Mission 
Since early 2000, the UN DPA and DPKO have re-organized several 
missions to become ‘integrated missions’. This concept is still being 
developed, but the basic principle, as outlined in the Secretary-
General’s Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, is to organize the 
UN mission around a common strategic plan that assists a country in 
its war-to-peace transition in a multi-dimensional manner.74 Instead of 
understanding peacekeeping as a matter of monitoring a ceasefire or 
peace agreement, the integrated mission approach is based on the un-
derstanding that progress is needed in security (and security sector re-
form), governance (and institution-(re)building), development, human 
rights and rule of law in order to for there to be a successful transition 
from war to peace.  
 
Many countries have adopted a similar approach to peacebuilding, of-
ten called ‘whole-of-government approach’ based on the ‘3Ds’ (Di-
plomacy, Development and Defence) or ‘comprehensive approach’. 
The integrated mission concept is therefore a way of organizing a mis-
sion. It assumes that by having staff with expertise from various 
fields, the mission will be able to develop a common strategic plan 
that can tackle the various aspects of transition and peacebuilding.75 It 
also assumes that the leadership and employees in the mission will 
have a more comprehensive understanding of the situation in the 
country as a result of the variety of expertise.  
 
The integrated process can also include the UN system as a whole, to 
help the UN agencies which make up the UN Country Team to deliver 
as ‘One UN’.  
5.1 UNAMA as an integrated mission 
UNAMA was set up as a political mission in 2002 by the UN Security 
Council, but with an integrated structure whereby the political and re-
lief, recovery and reconstruction pillars of activity would answer to 
the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG).76 The 
background for this type of organization was the 2000 Brahimi Report 
                                                 
74  United Nations, Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, 9 December 2005. 
75  For a more thorough background on the integrated mission concept and the challenges 
attached to it see de Coning 2007b. 
76  UNAMA’s original set-up is explained in detail in the Security Council report 2002/278. 
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which argued that, with the UN increasingly deployed to create post-
conflict situations, peacekeepers and peacebuilders have become in-
separable partners.77  
 
The main difference from other peacekeeping and peacebuilding mis-
sions is that UNAMA does not have implementing powers. It has no 
resources to carry out programmes or projects, as only the UN agen-
cies can actually implement programmes. For example, the military 
and police units are advisory units as the UN has no Blue Helmets on 
the ground. Therefore UNAMA’s work focuses mainly on the strate-
gic policy level, pushing certain neglected policies onto the agenda in 
coordination meetings that it facilitates, and trying to get the Kabul 
government and the international community to agree on the content 
of specific policies.  
 
Working at the policy level links into UNAMA’s coordination role. 
Most units have a coordination function – as with the rule of law unit, 
which runs the Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism (PJCM). 
Under the PJCM, UNAMA has been able to scope out who does what 
and where in terms of the justice programmes, and can thus make rec-
ommendations on what is needed, and where. Ideally, all units should 
be able to do the same; however, some units – such as the governance 
unit – have focused on advising, liaising and monitoring governance 
policies and assisting the Independent Directorate for Local Govern-
ance (IDLG).  
 
Under an integrated mission, the staff is intended to have a wide range 
of skills and expertise that can be drawn on to fully understand the si-
tuation and thereby provide policy advice as well as draw up a com-
mon strategic plan for the mission that sees the country as a whole. 
That is the goal; however, there are several challenges involved in 
meeting this goal. 
 
First, in order for each unit to give policy advice in their respective 
areas, a certain degree of expertise is required. In the early days, 
UNAMA focused on having a core team of experts, but today the re-
cruitment system set up at UN Headquarters in New York sends peo-
ple without any knowledge or experience of Afghanistan, or any pol-
icy knowledge or specific qualifications for the portfolio to be cov-
ered. Being able to provide policy advice to the government as well as 
the UN and international community as well as coordinate other actors 
requires specific competency, and it is an absolute necessity for effec-
tiveness. It is also the basis for being seen as a credible coordinator. 
Very few commentators have focused on UN human resource man-
                                                 
77  S/2000/809,pp 8–9. 
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agement, even though it is of key importance for any UN mission to 
be effective and provide any value added.78  
 
This relates to the second challenge: UNAMA needs its own strategic 
plan in order to be an effective coordinator. Aside from the SC man-
date, there is no single document that resembles a strategic plan out-
lining the ‘ends, ways and means’ of what the various units in 
UNAMA should do. From 2002 to 2005 the Bonn Agreement deter-
mined the strategic plan, but there has been no post-Bonn vision or 
plan. There is currently no mission statement that clarifies for the staff 
what the aim of the mission is, besides ‘promoting peace and stabil-
ity’.79 The SRSG has repeatedly argued that the solution in Afghani-
stan is not military, but political. However, what the political solution 
is and how UNAMA should organize its activities to work towards 
this solution remain untold.  
 
Moreover, opinion differs as to whether UNAMA should have its own 
strategy. Some argue that UNAMA’s strategy is to promote the gov-
ernment’s Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and 
that, as such, the job of UNAMA is to ensure that the various UN 
agencies and donors are aligned with ANDS. While this is an impor-
tant role for UNAMA, others argue that ANDS cannot be UNAMA’s 
political strategy/ solution. The ANDS is a development strategy, not 
a strategy for how to stabilize the country. While joint planning and 
strategizing with the government is important, it should not hinder 
UNAMA in developing its own strategic plan that includes what is 
expected of each unit to achieve the mission’s overarching goal of 
stability and, second to that, coordination.  
 
With the establishment of the Analysis and Planning Unit (and the 
abolition of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)) there have 
been attempts to use the competencies within the mission to develop 
common stances on various policies; however, this has not yet amoun-
ted to a common strategic plan for the mission. The consequence of 
not having such a plan is that the over 20 field offices lack direction 
from headquarters and operate very differently across the country. But 
what donors want is more field offices, particularly in provinces whe-
re they have PRTs and where UNAMA is not present.  
 
The third challenge is that not all units want to have a common plan, 
particularly not the humanitarian actors. They argue that their work 
should not be used to achieve an overarching political objective, as 
that would compromise their standing as independent, neutral and im-
                                                 
78  Interview, Kabul, September 2009. 
79  United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Fact Sheet, 28 March 2008, 
http://unama.unmissions.org 
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partial, with the humanitarian principle as the ultimate objective. This 
challenge to the integrated mission concept led OCHA to establish a 
separate office in Afghanistan in late 2008. This was a result of the 
humanitarian community feeling that UNAMA had become ‘too po-
litical’ and close to the government and the military, and that, by be-
ing closely associated with UNAMA, they would put themselves at 
risk.80 However, OCHA is dependent on UNAMA for offices in the 
field (it is expensive to have separate offices in insecure areas) and for 
their established relationships for negotiating humanitarian access. It 
is still questionable whether one can conclude that the humanitarian 
actors cannot be part of an integrated mission, as part of the struggle 
seems to involve a turf battle between leaderships and the inability of 
the Secretary-General to make some tough calls.  
 
Nevertheless, there are several ways that the integrated mission ap-
proach has benefited the work of each unit. For one thing, there is a 
deeper understanding of the political dimension to the conflict as well 
as the cross-section of issues affecting the conflict and development. 
This aspect is particularly evident in the field offices, where there is 
generally only one staff member per unit and thus much more cross-
fertilization. Secondly, logistically and in terms of service and secu-
rity, being in an integrated mission means sharing compounds, secu-
rity personnel, transport such as helicopters, and services, such as hav-
ing the same press office and spokesperson. Third, it represents the 
UN’s best attempt at being coherent and presenting one face to the 
outside world.  
5.2 Integrated Mission and the UN Country Team 
UNAMA has been provided with a clear mandate to coordinate all UN 
activities in Afghanistan. Until recently, the over 20 UN agencies op-
erating there have been implementing programmes in a free-for-all 
style with little coherence and coordination. While ‘delivering as one’ 
has been the mantra, each agency is answerable to a separate Board of 
Directors that have different agendas for their agencies. Ensuring in-
ternal UN coordination has therefore been a challenge, even though 
the UN organizations are ultimately answerable to the UNAMA 
SRSG. 
 
UNAMA, through its DSRSG for the Relief, Recovery & Reconstruc-
tion pillar (who also is the UN Resident Coordinator), has neverthe-
less been able to make progress in developing a common strategic 
framework together with the UN agencies. Almost one year of work 
went into a process that produced the UN Development Assistance 
Framework (UNDAF), which has three priority areas: 1) Good Gov-
                                                 
80  Niland 2004: 62. 
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ernance, Peace & Stability, 2) Sustainable Livelihoods: Agriculture, 
Food Security and Income Opportunities and 3) Basic Social Services: 
Education, Health and Sanitation. The UNDAF is in line with ANDS 
and has an emphasis on building the institutional capacity of the gov-
ernment at the sub-national level as well as being more coordinated. 
The UNDAF process has resulted in the UN agencies having various 
joint programmes as well as having agreed to deliver ‘provincial 
packages’ that should bring visible change to hitherto under-served 
provinces.  
 
The new UNDAF for 2010–2014 marks a substantial change from the 
previous framework, in that the UN agencies appear to be more coor-
dinated and that the programmes are based on the current realities of 
state-building needs as well as the status of the conflict. While the 
work of UNDAF has been carried out under the direction of the office 
of the DSRSG/RC, it is still somewhat de-linked from the rest of 
UNAMA’s work, but this seems to be because UNAMA has no stra-
tegic framework of its own. 
 
 

6. Conclusion 
Various lessons can be learned from the UN venture in Afghanistan. 
The most prominent ones are:  
 
 A clear and independent mandate is needed for the UN to carry 
out its ‘good offices’ mandate properly when deployed to a 
conflict or post-conflict zone. 
 
 The work of the UN will be largely futile if individual states 
are working at cross-purposes with the UN’s peacebuilding ef-
forts. Short-term military gains may have devastating long-
term political consequences, as was the case with supporting 
local militias and warlords in Afghanistan. 
 
 Future operations should be based on the light footprint spirit 
(local sovereignty and ownership), but should resource the 
mission with considerable professional expertise – in order to 
assist government institutions carry out their functions, but 
also to coordinate the international community more effec-
tively. The UN should also set up provincial teams to support 
provincial authorities.  
 
 The international community should have only one body that 
is responsible for coordinating civilian and military efforts. 
The body should also delineate an overarching strategy for all 
parties, in agreement with the host government.  
 
 The UN needs to have mechanisms, technical knowledge and 
capacity in order to be an effective coordinator. Nevertheless, 
the best way to ensure coordination while also building strong 
institutions is to channel financial assistance through the coun-
try’s national budget.  
 
 The integrated mission way of organization should be pro-
moted, but it is also important for the management to learn to 
draw on a wide range of resources and devise a common op-
erational plan. 
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